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Abstract

This paper analyzes the liquidity of the banks, both precautionary and involuntary liquidity. We
apply dynamic panel estimation on individual bank data covering the period of January 2002 to November
2011. The result shows precautionary liquidity is more determined by the operation of the bank. On the
other hand, the involuntary liquidity is more affected by the financial system condition. Controlling the
size of the bank, the effect of the financial system condition and the macro economy is larger for the small
banks. Moreover, the monetary policy in the form minimum reserve requirement affects the precautionary
liquidity of the small banks; while the central bank rate is less influential to the bank liquidity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Bank is an intermediary institution that accepts from and channels funds to the society. The
performance individual banks and the banking system in aggregate will highly depend on how
the banks manage their assets and their liability.The banks manage their assets and their liability
to gain profit and to raise the company value within some rules. The rules include sufficient
liquidity, low risk and sufficient capitals. Therefore, the management of assets and liability are
highly related to the bank liquidity. According to Keynes (1936), the three motivations in holding
cash or liquidity are for transaction, precaution, and speculation. Furthermore, Edgeworth
(1888) with the square root of law of precautionary reserves principle, the liquidity reserve of
the bank will increase equivalently to the root of the number of transactions.
Liquidity is vulnerable and can be suddenly drained from a bank. The liquidity problems
at one bank can spread to other banks that will eventually pose a systemic risk. A shock can
create liquidity spiral that leads to the loss of liquidity and may form financial crisis. Learning
from the history, the banking crises lately was mainly due to the liquidity crisis that caused
the banks fail to pay their obligations. Within the framework of the financial system safety
net (FSSN), as also proposed by Bagehot (1873), the central bank as the lender of last resort
(LLR) provides temporary liquidity loans with specific requirements to maintain the stability of
banking system. The liquidity assistance is granted especially when the failure of bank may
cause contagion effect and lead a systemic risk. Goodhart (1987) states that there is no clear
distinction between the condition of illiquid and insolvent, but banks that need liquidity through
LLR are suspect to be in the process of becoming bankrupt.
In general, the liquidity reserve of a bank is a guarantee or a precaution over a possible
financial penalty due to the increasing withdrawals or an increase in the minimum reserve
requirement. Some banks choose a strategy to have excess liquidity to give a signal of strong
liquidity to the market. However, excess liquidity may also be interpreted that the banks
have a bad liquidity management and is sub optimal on managing their assets portfolio and
liabilities.
The excess liquidity can also be the result of poor infrastructure in the payment system and
inter bankmoney market. Di Giorgio (1999) argues that the level of financial system development
can be reflected by the participation cost within the financial system. In developed countries, the
cost to process information, project evaluation and monitoring of borrowers is relatively low.
This allows the banks to manage their liquidity with a relatively low liquidity reserves. On the
contrary, the country with poor payment systems and with limited infrastructure on interbank
money market tends to complicate the banks in managing their liquidity. This leads them to
hold higher liquidity reserve.
In micro-banks, the asset and liability management of banks concerns the aspects of
liquidity risk, market risk, trading risk, capital and fund raising, profit target and growth plans.
Generally the banks face three types of risk; credit risk (transaction, counterparty, concentration,
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol16/iss3/2
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v16i3

2

Wuryandani et al.: Fund Management And the Liquidity of The Bank
Fund Management and The Liquidity of The Bank

233

and settlement), market risk (interest rate, exchange rate, liquidity), and operational risks
(processes, systems infrastructure, human resources). The main focuses in asset and liability
management by the banks are liquidity risk, exchange rate, and interest rates. In this case,
the optimal liquidity is the liquidity that is able to create optimal revenue and prevent the
occurrence of liquidity risk. At macro level, from the central bank perspective, an optimal asset
and liability management by the banks is the one that create liquidity in accordance with the
target of monetary policy.
Currently, the management of assets and liabilities by the banks in Indonesia indicates a fair
amount of surplus liquidity3. This excess is absorbed by the central bank through monetary policy
with market or non-market approach. The market operations involve monetary transactions
between the central bank and the banks in order to lower or to increase the liquidity in the
market. This includes the selling or buying the government securities or Certificate of Bank
Indonesia.
In Indonesia, monetary policy tends to be contractionary to absorb the excess liquidity
in banking. This condition arises as the consequence of the bail out policy in financial crisis of
1998 when dealing with the bank run within banking system. The non-market approach to the
monetary policy is conducted through minimum reserve requirement which dictate the banks
to place minimum amount of their funds at central bank.
Ganley (2004) stated that the surplus of liquidity can cause problems for central banks on
transmitting his monetary policy. It can also create difficulties for the central bank to intervene
the currency market. Moreover, excess liquidity may disturb the balance sheet and the income
statement of the central bank. The distortion on monetary policy effectiveness will likely lead
to a problem on the financial sustainability of the central bank, particularly when the main
instruments for monetary policy is the central bank securities.
The main source of bank liquidity is capital inflows such as long-term foreign investment,
short-term portfolio investment, and the fiscal deficit financing. With free foreign exchange
regimes, the capital inflow to Indonesia either long-term or speculative, is a significant
determinant for national liquidity. Speculative capital inflow is more distortive for the financial
system and monetary stability. On the other hand, a long term capital inflow will support the
domestic economic growth and job opportunities.
This paper will analyze the impact of banks behavior in Indonesia in accepting deposit and
channeling funds on their liquidity. Furthermore, this paper will also identify the determinants
of banking system liquidity, and the role of monetary policy on the liquidity management of
the bank.

3

Surplus of liquidity occurs when the cash flow on the market exceeds the needs for reserves, (Ganley, 2004). Within market
equilibrium, this is an ex ante disequilibrium and tends to be persistent due to autonomous increase of liquidity on central bank.
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The next section of this paper provides theoretical background and existing literatures
on liquidity. Section three present the data and the research methodology, while section four
discussed result and analysis. Section five present the conclusion and close this paper.

II. THEORY
2.1. Determinant of Bank Liquidity
In terms of micro-enterprises, the Bank for International Settlements (2008) defines liquidity
as the ability of the bank to finance the asset increase and meet liabilities without incurring
losses. Valla, Escorbiac and Tiesset (2006) and Vodova (2011) define liquidity as the ability
to meet cash liabilities, and can be distinguished into funding liquidity and market liquidity4.
Borio (1997, 2001) argues that it is necessary to distinguish between ex ante liquidity balance
before the central bank intervention and ex post after central bank intervention. Edlin and
Jaffee (2009) stated that high liquidity is due to the ‘credit crunch’ or the reluctance of banks
to channel the credit.
The development and liquidity conditions are not only affected by the bank’s business
activities but are also influenced by the money market. With a well functioning money market,
the banks can better manage their liquidity and avoid deficiency or excess liquidity. The
money market in a country is determined by the market structure, the available instrument,
development, regulation, and the market liquidity. The liquidity condition of the financial system
will determine the monetary policy taken by the central bank in order to achieve the target of
inflation and to maintain the sustainable growth momentum.
The interbank money market (PUAB) or also called interbank call money market is a place
for the banks to lendor to borrow funds to keep their liquidity. The transaction is short-term
and is used to deal with daily liquidity gap. The PUAB is executed over the counter (OTC) with
direct communication among banks through Reuter Dealing Monitoring System (RDMS). The
structure of interbank money market in Indonesia tends to be oligopoly and segmented, and
is very shallow. This condition makes the banks less flexible in obtaining and allocating optimal
liquidity. Most major banks tend to hold excess liquidity and more often serve as a lender. The
segmentation in the interbank market creates sub system of money market within them. In
this case, the same lender banks and same borrower banks will transact within their group
continuously. These conditions led to different levels of counterparty risk and variation across
segments including price disparity. Under conditions of tight liquidity, the segmentation of this
interbank market tends to be stronger with increasing counterparty risk. This condition tends to
encourage interbank rate to increase and the price disparity to widen. In this case, the motivation
of banks to not release liquidity grows higher in order to maintain adequate liquidity.
4

A funding liquidity (Valla, Escorbiac, and Tiesset, 2006) is the asset that is ready to be converted into cash to meet liabilities or for
operational activity, while market liquidity is defined as the activities of banks in trading assets shown by the ability of banks to sell
non-liquid assets.
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The structure of the Indonesian financial markets has a very limited instrument of which
there is a short-term securities instrument, which is no more than one year, such as commercial
paper, certificates of Bank Indonesia, repurchase agreements, banker’s acceptances, and
certificates in the interbank money market instruments deposit. The ever shallow instrument in
PUAB encourages banks to manage short term liquidity by holding onto a limited variation of the
instrument. In general, banks tend to have instruments that are highly liquid with low risk like
government securities (sovereign), the central bank securities, and other short-term securities.
Besides market conditions, various regulations related to risk management and liquidity urges
banks to behave in certain way in managing both liquidity and asset and liability portfolios.
The money market is an outlet or the foremost means of most major banks in managing
liquidity. The liquidity condition of the bank will be directly reflected in money market both in
the volume of transactions and the dynamic of interest rate. The tight liquidity in the banking
is marked by the rising interbank rates and the widening spreads between the purchase and
the selling price. The tight level of bank liquidity is reflected in the loan rate (borrowing) and
financing rate (lending). The indicative rate for interbank market is reflected in JIBOR (Jakarta
Interbank Offered Rate), which is the average price of the quotations from the contributor banks.
These JIBOR were published through Reuters and Bloomberg and also reported by the bank on
daily basis on their daily reports (Laporan Harian Bank Umum, (LHBU). In addition to JIBOR, the
average price of all banks can be monitored via LHBU on the central bank website.
In Indonesia commercial banks participating in interbank money market possess wide
gap in assets and capital. By the end of 2011, the capital of the bank ranged from 0.15 - 54
trillion rupiahs, while their asset ranged from 0.17 trillion to 465 trillion Rupiahs. There are only
7 (seven) banks with asset above 100 trillion rupiah, while banks with assets below 1 trillion
rupiahs were 20 banks out of a total of 122 banks.
The results of Vodova’s research (2011) indicates that the liquidity of the banks in
Czech, measured by several indicators, were positively determined by capital adequacy ratio
(CAR), interest rate loans, the nonperforming loans (NPL), and inter-bank rate. On the other
hand, the financial crisis, inflation, and economic growth had a negative impact on liquidity.
The unemployment, interest rate margins, profitability, and the monetary interest rate do not
significantly affect the liquidity of the banks. Vodova measure the liquidity in his study with the
ratio of liquid assets (cash, demand deposits at the central bank) to total asset, bank liabilities,
and credit line with the other bank’s counterparties.
Shen, Chen, Kao, and Yeh (2009) conducted a study to determine the factors of liquidity
risk by using panel data from 12 countries. The result of the study indicates that liquidity risk
is affected by illiquid assets, external financing, supervision, regulation, and macroeconomics.
Liquidity risk is negatively correlated with the performance of the banks in countries with a
market-based financial system. On the other hand, in countries with bank-based financial
system, the liquidity risk is not associated with the bank’s performance.
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Saxegaard (2006) states that banks will hold excess liquidity more than precautionary
reserve when the economy is in liquidity trap condition. Under these conditions the yield is too
low compared to credit intermediation cost, of which the returns from the funds placed at the
central bank is better than channeling credit. The result of a study by Aizenman Agenor, and
Hoffmaister (2000) indicates that the contraction in credit financing in Thailand after crisis,
caused by the phenomenon of supply resulting in involuntary excess liquidity.
Research by Bathaluddin et al (2012) stated that the tendency for the banks in Indonesia to
store excess liquidity is influenced by the need for currency fluctuations, economic growth, cost
of funds, and significant liquidity lag. The precautionary liquidity in the study was defined as the
ratio of the bank funds placed in central bank securities (excess liquidity) to the third-party funds.
On the other hand, involuntary liquidity is the residual of the estimated precautionary liquidity.
Pontes and Sol Murta (2012) found that excess liquidity occurs due to the weak development of
the financial sector where the interbank market is less efficient, a low diversification of financial
instruments, and weak credit intermediation due to the expensive costs.
The total liquidity of the banks in agregate will not change despite the change in the
liquidity ratio at bank level. However, these changes affect the composition of liquidity in the
presence of excess liquidity. Based on the research conducted by Keister and McAndrew (2009),
the amount of liquidity available in the bank is determined by central banks policy and does not
reflect their financing behavior. On the other hand, Ganley (2004) argues that some factors that
determine the liquidity of banks are beyond the control of the central banks. These include the
flow of their reserve to and from central bank,and the amount of money hold by the public.
Aspachs, Nier, and Tiesset (2005) conducted a study on bank liquidity in the UK using
quarterly data of individual banks from 1985 to 2003. The results showed that the greater the
support of central bank liquidity in the times of crisis, the lower the liquidity reserves held by the
bank. Most banks in the UK also tend to do a counter-cyclical liquidity strategy with low liquidity
back up when the economy grows. The liquid assets in this study consist of cash, reverse repo,
and commercial paper. The dependent variable is the liquidity ratio, which is measured by the
ratio of liquid assets to total assets, or the ratio of liquid assets to total deposits. The explanatory
variables consisted of Net Interest Margin (NIM), the profit, the credit growth, bank size, the
growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the short-term interest rates. Interest rates and
GDP have a strong influence on liquidity, as well as the opportunity for future financing.
On the other hand, Acharya and Merrouche (2010) analyzed the bank demand for
liquidity and settlement in UK as well as its effect on the interbank market before and after
the sub-prime crisis. The result showed that the bank in UK hold liquidity 30 percent higher
after the interbank suspension in August 9, 2007, showing precautionary action. This creates
a tight liquidity conditions and created crisis. The increased demand for liquidity by the banks
has raised the interest rate and potentially created systemic risk.
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Some actions required to reduce the stress and the volatility of interest rate in interbank
money market are monitoring, early stress test, recapitalization for the troubled banks, and
increase the liquidity above the emergency liquidity reserves. The results of the study by Berger
and Bouwman (2009) shows that monetary policy does not have a significant effect on the
liquidity for large and medium-sized banks with 90 percent possession of the market liquidity,
or above. The monetary policy is instead effectively affecting the liquidity of small banks. In
addition, there is no significant difference between the effects of monetary policy during the
financial crisis and in normal times.
Henry, Birchwood, and Primus (2010) conducted a study to estimate the demand for
precautionary reserves and dynamic impact of involuntary reserve on monetary policy in Trinidad
and Tobago, by using the GMM (generalized method moments) and VAR (Vector Autoregression)
method. Their results showed that the bank holded excess reserve as precautionary action
against liquidity shortages. The spread between lending rates and policy rate negatively
affects precautionary reserves of the bank. In addition, the dynamics of involuntary reserves
are influenced mainly by fiscal operations. Similarly, a decreasing allocated credit during slow
economic growth tended to increase the liquidity of the bank.
Another study conducted by Pontes and Sol Murta (2010) using TSLS (two stage least
squares) show that the credit growth, the government securities and the crisis influence the
bank liquidity. High lending rate will disturb the bank intermediation, thus causing liquidity
accumulation.

2.2. The Role of Monetary Policy
The central bank’s monetary policy is implemented to maintain monetary stability in order
to control the national liquidity. By implementing liquidity management we expect to attain
sustainable economic development. In Indonesia, the central bank sets policy rate (BI rate) as
a reference for the market participants.
The instruments of monetary policy currently consist of Certificate of Bank Indonesia (SBI),
standing facility of Bank Indonesia, and the minimum reserve requirement (GiroWajib Minimum,
GWM). Bank Indonesia use SBI and term deposit for open market operation.
The maturity for Certificate of Bank Indonesia (SBI) was initially one month then in 2011
Bank Indonesia extended the holding period to six months. The maturity for term deposits is
longer up to nine months. On the other hand, the standing facility of Bank Indonesia set since
June 2008 is to fine tune the market operation particularly to control the overnight interest
rate (ON) within the interbank money market. This is helpful to keep the ON rate to move
around the BI rate (interest rate corridor), hence will ensure the effectiveness of monetary policy
transmission through the interest rate channel.
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The standing facility consists of deposit and lending facilities with interest rates based
on BI rate plus or minus certain spread. When the bank holds excess liquidity, they can deposit
their excessive funds in Bank Indonesia using deposit facility; otherwise use lending facility when
they face a liquidity shortage. The interest rate corridor originally used symmetrical spread to
the BI rate movement. At the end of 2012 the spread between deposit facility and BI rate was
-175 basis points, while the spread between lending facilities amounted to +100 basis points
from the BI rate.
The non-market monetary policy instruments includes minimum reserve requirement
(GWM) rule the banks to place their funds in Bank Indonesia by certain percent of the funds
the collect from third parties. Nowdays, the reserve requirement policy is associated with the
Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LDR). The aim is to optimize the use of liquidity by increasing the banking
intermediation to support the economic growth. In this case the banks are required to meet
the LDR of 78-100 percent, otherwise the central bank will impose additional minimum reserve
requirement. The central bank provides time deposit for the bank, which is limited up to 3
percent of their third-party funding. The incentive to deposit their fund is the BI rate minus 2.5
%, therefore will not burden the banks due to their loss of time value of money.
The management of assets and liabilities is very essential to keep the operation of the
bank. The liquidity conditions may affect the systemic risk and monetary policy transmission. The
uncertain withdrawal by depositors encourages the banks to choose best strategy on asset and
liability management to ensure they meet their laibilities. In addition, changes and volatility in
interest rates, and the exchange rate will determine the compliance with the conditions capable
of fund withdrawal liability, either suddenly or massively simultaneous.
Freixas, Martin and Skeie (2009) conducted a study of the efficiency in the interbank money
market fund allocation and the optimal policy of the central bank in the presence of liquidity
shock. The results of the research showed that distributional liquidity shock crisis will increase the
market segmentation across bank (disparity), and the central bank should lower the interbank
rate. The failure to lower interest rates in the times of crisis will worsen the financial stability
with the increasing probability of a bank run (simultaneous withdrawals by depositors).
On macro interest perspective, Saxegaard (2006) mentioned the need to distinguish
between precautionary excess liquidity with involuntary excess liquidity (excess liquidity that
exceeds the precationary). He found that in Sub-Saharan Africa countries (SSA), banks tend to
have excess liquidity that is involuntary due to the underdeveloped financial markets, the lack
of credit allocation, and the increasing government deposits at the bank. If a bank has excess
liquidity to meet the needs of anticipation (precautionary), the central bank does not need to
sterilize the economy since it potentiallytrigger inflation.
The behavior of the banks in SSA above may indicate a structural problem that causes
the inefficient allocation of funds. The involuntary liquidity in general serves as a secondary
reserve and is intended to address the possibility of liquidity gap in bank operation or the
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol16/iss3/2
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v16i3

8

Wuryandani et al.: Fund Management And the Liquidity of The Bank
Fund Management and The Liquidity of The Bank

239

likelihood of liquidity shocks. By holding the involuntary liquidity it naturally means the banks
pay opportunity cost to obtain income. In this case, Sacerdoti (2005) argues that SSA countries
need development of debtor information, accounting and auditing standards, and also legal
and regulatory framework. O’Connell (2005) also argues that involuntary excess liquidity will
disturb the mechanism of monetary policy transmission. Thus, an understanding of the sources
of excess liquidity becomes important to choose optimal monetary policy.
On his study about the pattern of excess liquidity banks in SSA countries above, Saxegaard
(2006) used SVAR (Structural Vector Autoregression). He also found the excess liquidity of the
banks weaken the mechanism of monetary policy transmission, and leave the monetary authority
unable to control the demand within the economy. Slightly in line with Saxegaard, Ganley (2004)
also stated that the liquidity absorption operation by the authority tended to use weak monetary
instruments such as central banks securities with high interest rates, making it less effective in
transmitting their monetary policy. In the long term, this raises important implications for the
central bank to finance the rising costs of monetary operations. This condition can seriously
affect the income of the central bank and its independency from the government. A continuous
loss of the central bank will require government recapitalization.
Meltzer (2009) and Feldstein (2009) argue that the increased liquidity can lead to an
inflationary pressure with rapid money creation through credit, and the central banks should
absorb this excess liquidity. However, Keister and McAndrews (2009) stated that the above
phenomena may occurs only when the central bank use a traditional monetary operation
framework. Currently, the Federal Reserve gives interest reward on bank liquidity deposited
at the central bank, thereby increasing market interest rates and restrain credit growth rate
without changing the amount of liquidity. By providing interest for reserves at the central bank,
the central bank may control the short-term interest rate which is independent from the level
of liquidity; therefore will not create inflationary pressures. In other words, the excess liquidity
in the bank does not always lead to inflationary pressures. A study by Bathaluddin, Adhi, and
Revelation (2012) using TVAR (threshold vector autoregression) indicates that there has been a
regime switching from the low liquidity to the high liquidity in Indonesia in 2005. Additionally,
excess liquidity caused ineffective monetary policy on controlling inflation.
Berger and Bouwman (2009) in his research show that monetary policy creates significant
effects of liquidity only to small banks. However, there is no significant difference of the impact
of monetary policy on liquidity creation during normal condition or crisis.

III. METHODOLOGY
The framework of this research is shown in the diagram below. The business activities
of the banks in collecting and allocating fund will affect their liquidity. On the other hand, the
liquidity conditions of the bank will affect the economic activity reflected on Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), hence the rate of inflation. The actual inflation and inflation expectations will
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2014
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determine the monetary policy reaction of the central bank on controlling liquidity in order
to achieve his inflation target. The policy will influence macroeconomic conditions such as
interest rate movements, the exchange rates, and the economic growth. The changes of these
macroeconomic measures will be anticipated by the individual banks to choose strategy on
collecting and allocating fund. The sources of fund to the banks are demand deposits, savings
deposits, time deposits, loans, and capital. On the other hand, the allocation of fund may take the
form of cash, demand deposits at the central bank, demand deposits in other banks, securities,
loans, and other placements. All the process is inter-related and form continuous cycle.

Macroeconomy
Nilai tukar
Suku bunga
Krisis
Penempatan dana
Kas
Giro dibank sentral
Giro dibank lain
Surat berharga
Kredit
Penempatan lainnya

Penghimpunan dana
Giro
Tabungan
Deposito
Pinjaman
Modal

Transmisi
Moneter

Reaksi Kebijakan
Moneter

Likuiditas
Precautionary
Involuntary

PDB

Inflation

Diagram 1. Research Framework

We use monthly data of individual banks from January 2002 to November 2011 published
on financial report of banks. The samples include 110 banks from the total population of 122
banks. In this study, the sampling covers only conventional banks, considering that Islamic banks
have a different operational activities and different money market. We classify the banks based
on asset;large banks with asset above 50 trillion rupiahs, medium banks with asset of 10 to 50
trillion rupiahs, and small banks with asset lower than 10 trillion rupiahs.
Within our sample, the smallest bank had assets above 100 billion rupiahs, following the
provision of capital limit of minimum 100 billion rupiahs since 2010. The selection of number
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol16/iss3/2
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of banks and period of observation meet the requirement that the cross section dimension is
larger than the period (N > T), which is useful on controlling individual heterogeneity when
there are unobservable behavior.
We specify a dynamic panel model and make use the estimation technique of generalized
method of moments (GMM). The selection of the best model is based on a panel data modeling
framework as shown in the diagram below.

Panel Data Model
Static Panel Data

Dynamic Panel Data
Jika lag dependent variable
digunakan: heterogeneity

HAUSMAN TEST
Fixed effects
Jika error
berkorelasi
dengan Xit
(regressors),

Random effects
Jika error tidak
berkorelasi
dengan Xit
(regressors),

Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM)
First difference
GMM

System
GMM

Diagram 2. Panel Data Model

The specification of empirical model for dynamic panel data model is below

Yit  Yi ,t 1   X it   it

(1)

Where Yit is the dependent variable (endogenous), Xit are explanatory variables (exogenous),
and mit are the residual. The instrument variable (IV) used is a certain lag of the endogenous and
exogenous of variables that are not correlated with the shock at time t. In general, symbols and
descriptions are used as variables in Table 1 appendix A.
Our endogenous variable is liquidity and we distinguish between precautionary and
involuntary as defined in Saxegaard (2006), Valla et al (2006) and Aspachs et al (2005). Yitis a
precautionary liquidity and Y2t is involuntary liquidity. The precautionary liquidity (Yit), is the ratio
of the cash plus minimum reserve requirements (RR), plus the placement on Bank Indonesia
and other banks (ODD), relative to total assets (TA). We specify the precautionary liquidity to
be more determined by the needs of the banks for operational activities.
Each bank needs different liquidity depending on their operation, market segments,
and tolerable risks. Based on focus group discussions, some banks consider the minimum
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precautionary liquidity to be approximately 2-10 percent. The threshold for liquid to total assets
ratio for each bank depends on business operations, historical liquidity needs and risk appetite.
The involuntary liquidity Y2t is the ratio between central bank securities (CBSEC) plus government
securities (GSEC) and other securities (OSEC), relative to total asset (TA). The deposit of the
bank on central bank may take the form of Bank Indonesia certificates, term deposits and bank
Indonesia standing facilities. In general, the banks consider the threshold of involuntary liquid
asset ratios to be 15-18%.

Y1t 

Y2t 

C  RR  ODD
TA

(2)

i, t

CBSEC  GSEC  OSEC
TA

i, t

(3)

To explain the determinant of precautionary and involuntary liquidity, we use the balance
sheet component, representing the source and the allocation of the fund, monetary policy,
financial system and the macroeconomic condition. We focus more on variables that are
considered to affect the precautionary liquidity directly including their business activities. On the
other hand, the involuntary liquidity variable is driven more by market conditions and financial
systems, as well as the macro economy. We use the empirical specification below:
Y1i ,t  Y1i ,t 1  1RRRATE t   2 DTi ,t   3CREDITi ,t   4 FSI t   5ON t   i ,t

DTi ,t 

DD  S
 TD
i, t
i, t
i, t
TA
i, t

CREDITi ,t 

CRED
TA

i, t

(4)

(5)

(6)

i, t

wherei = 1,...., N is the observations and t = 1.... T is the monthly time dimension from
January 2002 to November 2011. Y1i,t-1 is the lag of the endogenous variable, RRRATE.t is the
level of reserve requirement, DTi,t in equation (5) is the ratio of deposits (including demand
deposits (DDi, t), savings (Si, t), and deposits (TDi, t) to total assets (TAi,t); CREDITi,t in equation (6)
is the ratio of credit (CREDi, t) to total assets (TAi, t). FSIt is financial stability index which represent
the pressure on financial system stability both in banking systems and capital markets; the ONt
is the interest rate for overnight interbank money market, and εi,t is error term.
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The equation for involuntary liquidity (Y2t) is below.
Y2 i ,t   Y2 i ,t 1   1 BIRATE t   2 ER t   3 CREDIT i ,t   4 FSI t   5 CAR i ,t   6 GDPt   i ,t

DIT i ,t   4 FSI t   5 CAR i ,t   6 GDPt   i ,t

(7)

wherei = 1,...., N is the observations and t = 1.... T is the monthly period of January 2002
to November 2011. Y2i,t-1 is the lag of involuntary liquidity; BIRATEt is the interest policy rate;
ERt is the nominal exchange rate, CREDITi,t is the ratio of loans to total assets, FSIt is financial
stability index, CARit is the capital adequacy ratio or the percentage of minimum bank capital
requirement, GDPt is gross domestic product, and εi,t is the error term.

IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
We outline the statistics of variables used in this study in the Table 2. The high standard
deviation of involuntary liquidity shows that liquidity volatility involuntary (Y2t) tends to be
dynamic throughout the observation period range, as depicted on Figure 1. On the contrary,
the precautionary liquidity tends to have a relatively stable volatility compared to the involuntary
liquidity, as indicated with its low standard deviation.
The movement range of precautionary liquidity is relatively lower about 500 basis points.
This indicates that involuntary liquidity movements tend to follow the dynamic of the economic
situation which move from 1300 basis points (13 percent). At the time of 2005 mini-crisis
and the international financial crisis of 2008, the financial stability index (FSI) was above the
threshold 2, and involuntary liquidity decreased quite significantly. This indicates that with a
liquidity problem in the market, the involuntary liquidity will be used as primary buffer. Banks
tend to hold high reserve when the liquidiy of the financial system is relatively high, and then
use it when the financial system downturn and become more volatile. These behavior are
countercyclical to the market liquidity condition.
On the other hand, the volatility of the exchange rate (ERt) is relatively stable. A significant
surge was in late 2008 until mid of 2009 when the global financial crisis occurred due to the
subprime mortgage crisis in United States as illustrated in chart 3. The relatively stable exchange
rate movement is influenced also by the policy intervention by the Central Bank. Maintaining
the stability of the exchange rate is one of central bank target as mandated under the Central
Bank Act, in addition to the target on inflation.
Based on Figure 4, the policy rate does not affect the decision of the bank to allocate
their fund in central bank. When BI rate decline, the bank keep increasing their placement of
funds on central bank.
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4.2. Precautionary Liquidity
The estimation result of precautionary liquidity using all banks is good and does not biased
upwards or downward (see Table 3 in Appendix D). The Sargan test statistics indicate that the
instrument variables (IV) used isvalid. The precautionary liquidity of all banks are significantly
influenced by previous precautionary liquidity, the minimum reserve requirement (RRRATEt), thirdparty funds (DTi,t), credit (CREDITi,t), financial stability index (FSIt), and interbank rates (ONt).
Across bank classification, our estimation indicates that the largest determinant of
precautionary liquidity are the level of previous precautionary liquidity, the third-party funds
(except for the medium-sized banks), the credit and the overnight rate of interbank market.
Banks still consider their historical liquidity conditions in determining the current one, and this is
in line with Bathaluddin et al (2012). The positive impact of third-party funds on precautionary
liquidity shows that when the third party fund increase, the bank face wider opportunities to
allocate funds including to expand their business. The level of allocated credit either in large
banks, medium, or small banks, negatively affect the level of precautionary liquidity; which is
consistent with Henry et al (2010) and Pontes and Sol Murta (2010).
Money market conditions reflected in overnight interbank rates (PUAB ON) negatively
influence the precautionary liquidity. The tight liquidity in the money market, as indicated by
the rising interbank rates will reduce the precautionary liquidity of the bank to overcome the
difficulty on obtaining liquidity. This is consistent with the results of Vodova (2011) and Acharya
and Merrouche (2010). On the other hand, the minimum reserve requirement (GWM) and the
financial stability index (FSI) do not significantly affect the precautionary liquidity, except on small
banks. This indicates that the non-market monetary policy using minimum reserve requirement
only affects the small banks, and is consistent with Berger and Bouwman (2009).
Small banks have limited activities hence will hold limited amount of liquidity reserve. This
is the reason why reserve requirement policy significantly affects their liquidity. On the other
hand, large and medium-sized banks hold higher liquidity. The amount is large enough to be
buffer for their operational acitivites; therefore a change in GWM will not affect their liquidity.
Furthermore, unlike the small banks, the large and medium-sized banks can easiliy fulfill their
liquidity needs from the interbank money market. In addition, when the banks deposit their funds
in central bank (maximum 3 percent of total third party funds), the central bank compensate
with 2 percent interest rate, and this is higher than the real cost.
Small bank liquidity is also affected by the stability of financial market. Estimation result
shows increasing FSI, which indicatesa lower stability of financial markets and usually followed
by a tight liquidity in the money market, will reduce the precautionary liquidity of the small
banks. These conditions show that the resilience of small bank liquidity is strongly depends on
the financial system condition, including the capital market.
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4.3. Involuntary liquidity
The involuntary liquidity equation in Table 4 Appendix D shows that the involuntary liquidity
at all banks is determined by its own lag of involuntary liquidity (Y2i,t), the monetary policy rate or
BI rate (BIRATEt), the interbank rates (ONt), the exchange rate (ERt), credit (CREDITi,t), the capital
adequacy ratio (CARi.t), the financial stability index (FSIt), and the gross domestic product (GDPt).
The increase in interbank rates, exchange rates, and the FSI will reduce the involuntary liquidity
of the bank. The estimation on all sample showed that the increase in policy rate will increase
the involuntary liquidity of the banks. Generally the banks tend to use their involuntary liquidity
as a buffer to maintain liquidity in the event of financial market and financial system shock. It
is important to note that the estimation using medium-sized banks does not produce a good
equation despite not biased upward or downward. This has been indicated by the Sargan test
that the instrument variables used were not valid.
In general, involuntary liquidity largely depends on the previous involuntary liquidity. On
large bank sample, the previous liquidity is the only significant explanatory variable. The strong
influence of historical involuntary liquidity is in line with Bathaluddin et al (2012). The interbank
rates (PUAB) ON significantly affect the involuntary liquidity, except for the large banks. On the
other hand, the effect of capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is significant for small bank sample and
overall sample. The significance of capital requirement (CAR) on involuntary liquidity is also in
line with the study of Vodova (2011).
Using all samples, we find the policy rate has small effect on the bank liquidity. However,
this is not the case when we estimate the sample across their size (large, medium, and small
banks). The weak impact of the policy rate (BI rate) on involuntary liquidity hold by the bank is
in line with Vodova (2012). Policy rate is not the reason for the banks to deposit their fund on
central bank. The volume of the placement of the funds in the central bank securities continues
to increase, despite of the decrease of the policy rate. In addition, the flexibility of central bank
security as liquidity instrument is lower if the maturity of security is longer. The banks may face
high liquidity because of the speed of channeling credit is lower then the speed of third party
fund increase. On the other hand, the placement of funds in other financial product is still
limited due to several limitations to transact in foreign exchange and stock market, as well as
under-developed money market instruments.
The exchange rate only affects the liquidity of medium-sized banks, while the interbank
rates only affect the liquidity of the medium and small banks. The involuntary liquidity on small
banks affected by the lag itself, interbank rates, CAR, FSI, and it shows that the liquidity GDP.
The condition of involuntary small banks is also determined by the macroeconomic conditions
and macroeconomic finance. The condition systems such as FSI and GDP are only affecting
small bank liquidity, in line with the results of the study Aspachs et al (2005).
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For the large bank sample, the previous involuntary liquidity significantly affects the current
involuntary liquidity. Other variables play minor impact on involuntary liquidity dynamics, which
indicates that major banks hold very high liquidity. Good liquidity resiliency of large banks
showed their better conditions on liquidity relative to smaller ones, and they tend to be lenders
in interbank money market. It is also supported by the fact that major banks are easier in raising
funds with lower cost than smaller banks. Furthermore, these large banks are equipped with
good infrastructure, networking, and more complete products, as well as better credibility.
Within this condition, smaller banks may necessary merger to better maintain their liquidity.

V. CONCLUSIONS
On this paper we devide the liquidity of banks into precautionary and involuntary
liquidity. Precautionary liquidity is the ratio between cash plus deposits on central banks and
other commercial banks, towards total assets; while involuntary liquidity is the ratio of tradable
securities (central bank securities, government securities, or other) towards total assets.
This paper showed that the accumulation and the management of the fund affect the bank
liquidity. Across the size of the bank, monetary policy and financial market condition (minimum
reserve requirement policy, interbank money market rate, and financial stability index) affect
more the precautionary liquidity of small banks. Furthermore, precautionary liquidity generally
depends on the operations of the bank, except for the small-sized banks.
The banks tend to use their involuntary liquidity as a buffer for their operational liquidity;
this is reflected by the dominant effect of financial market condition on the bank’s involuntary
liquidity. The monetary policy rate (BI rate) only affects the involuntary liquidty of the mediumsized banks, and not for the large and small ones. Furthermore, the macroeconomic conditions
such as financial stability index and gross domestic product, is also only affect the involuntary
liquidity of small banks.
Our conclusion above imply the central bank does not need to implement strict liquidity
absorption using policy interest rate, since the bank’s liquidity depend more on the operating
conditions, the capital, the financial system, and the macroeconomic condition.
Our result implicitely show that the banks tend to hold high liquidity involuntarily because
of the financial markets in Indonesia is shallow, and because of high uncertainty to get liquidity
from the market. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the depth of financial markets to expand
liquidity instrument. This will serve as good buffer for the banks and provide them flexibility on
managing their liquidity. The banks need to reduce their dependency on central banks, and
one way to do this is by reviewing the central bank standing facilities.
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On the other hand, small banks have less immunity against the macroeconomic and
financial market condition. This implies a necessity for the small bank to merge and to combine
their asset, which will help them better manage their liquidity and increase their credibility. From
global perspective, this will also help Indonesian banking system to compete in international
markets such as forthcoming ASEAN Economic Community, 2015.
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Appendix B
All data obtained from the statistic of the Bank Indonesia publication which are
longitudinal/monthly panel data from individual of conventional bank, monetary policy, money
market and foreign exchange and macro economy from January 2002 to November 2011.
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Precautionary (Y1i,t) liquidity is the ratio between the summation of cash, account in BI and
account in other banks and total assets as described in equation (2). Involuntary (Y2i,t) liquidity
is the ratio between securities composite that is ready sold consisting of fund placement in
Central Bank in the shapes of securities, government securities and other securities and total
assets as described in equation (3). In this graph precautionary and involuntary liquidity are
liquidity aggregate.
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Figure 1. Precautionary (Y1i,t) and
Involuntary (Y2i,t) Liquidity
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Appendix C
FSI (financial stability index) is composite index in money market consisting of banking
and capital market for measuring the durability of financial system. Involuntary (Y2i,t) liquidity
is the ratio between securities composite that is ready sold consisting of fund placement in
Central Bank in the shapes of securities, government securities and other securities and total
assets as described in equation (3).
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Figure 2. FSI and Involuntary Liquidity

BIRATEt is interest rate of monetary policy determined by Central Bank in order to an
open market operation. ERt is the nominal of exchange value.

�����

���������

�����

�������
�����

�����

��
��
��
��

����

��

����

�
�

����

�

����
�

�
� � �� � � � � �� � �� � � � � �� � � � � �� � �� � �
���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ����

�

�����������������������

Figure 3. BI Rate and Exchange Nominal
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CBSECi,t is bank fund placement in Bank Central such as in the shapes of term deposit,
securities of Bank Indonesia, and facilities of Bank Indonesia. BIRATEt is the interest rate of
monetary policy determined by central bank for the operation of open market.
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Figure 4. BI Rate and Bank Fund
Placement on Securities in Central Bank
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Appendix D
This table shows the result of GMM (generalized method moment) on precautionary
liquidity (see table 1. for symbol and variable description). The model of precautionary liquidity
follows the equation (4). Instrument of variable (IV) which is used is dependent and independent
lag, in which the length of every IV of every model is different to get a significant result. The
number of samples for all banks are 110, big bank 17, medium bank 28, and small bank 65,
based on the amount of asset. Sampling for the period January 2002 until November 2011
uses the monthly data longitudinal panel.
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This table shows the result of GMM (generalized method moment) to the determinant
(see table 1. For symbol and variable description) involuntary liquidity on equation (7). The
Definition of involuntary liquidity is in equation (3). Instrument of variable (IV) what is used is
dependent and independent lag, in which the length of IV every model is different to get a
significant result. Sampling for all banks are 110, big banks are 17, medium banks are 28, and
small banks are 65, based on the amount of assets. Sampling is for period from January 2002
to November 2011 by using the monthly data of longitudinal panel.
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